



















TIME’S ARROW FROM THE MULTIVERSE POINT OF VIEW
MARTIN TAMM
Abstract. In this paper I suggest a possible explanation for the asymmetry
of time. In the models that I study, the dynamical laws and the boundary
conditions are completely symmetric, but the behaviour of time is not. The
underlying mechanism is a spontaneously broken symmetry on the micro-level
which is closely related to the idea of multiple histories in quantum mechanics.
The situations that I will discuss are very simple and could even in a sense
be called classical, but the character of the mechanism is so general that the
results are likely to carry over to more complicated cases. Since the computa-
tional difficulties are enormous, I mainly use heuristic methods and computer
computations to exploit these ideas.








To explain the second law of thermodynamics and the non-symmetric behaviour
of time is a fundamental problem in contemporary physics. In any situation known
to us, the direction towards the future differs from the direction towards the past
by the property that in the former entropy increases, but in the latter it decreases.
The question is: What causes this asymmetric behaviour?
It may very well be that the problem of time is too complex to have a simple
solution in the usual physical or mathematical sense of the word. But it can still be
that we can clarify the problem in a convincing way by constructing models of the
universe where the reasons for the break of time-symmetry can be seen clearly. A
remote analogy might be the following: For more than 2000 years, mathematics was
plagued by the problem with Euclid’s fifth Postulate. Enormous efforts were made
to prove it from the other Postulates, but once the right strategy was found (in this
case to construct different models for geometries satisfying the other Postulates),
the dispute could quickly be brought to an end.
In this paper, a central theme is the concept of multiple histories. The idea to
use this concept to explain the asymmetry of time is not new, but my ambition
in this paper is not so much to present new physics as to try to find a way out of
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the confusion. Hence, I have tried to make the frame-work as simple as possible in
order to make the fundamental problem come out more clearly.
A part of the problem is that we inevitably have to deal with two different
view-points; The microscopic and the macroscopic perspectives. In this paper,
this double perspective is always present. After a short analysis of the problem
and a presentation of the multiverse from my point of view in Sections 2 and
3, I turn in Section 4 to the dynamical laws. In Section 5, I then give a very
simple example of a (microscopic) dynamical principle which from a deterministic
point of view is completely time-symmetric, but which from the multiverse point
of view generates a break of symmetry. In Sections 6, 7 and 8 I then turn to
the opposite (cosmological) perspective. Using heuristic methods I argue that a
dynamical principle which generates multiple histories on the micro-level is also
likely to generate a global broken symmetry of time. In Section 9 I then, using
ideas that are very close to the ones in Section 5, try to model this behaviour in an
extremely small multiverse containing only three particles. This model is at least
within reach for computational methods. In Section 10, I conclude by making some
remarks.
The reader may note one peculiar fact in the following: Although in a way the
omnipresent concept is entropy, not a single formula or computation containing
entropy is included. This is in the same time a problem and the motivation for this
work. It is a problem since computing the entropy is really what I would like to
do. In a better world than ours, the computational difficulties of this paper would
perhaps be treated by brute force using computers. As it is, the computations in
the following are, in their present form, both in a sense too difficult to be handled
by computers and too simple to be satisfactory. But still, we have to make use of
the possibilities we have at hand to reach understanding.
2. The riddle of time
Although the cosmological perspective on the issue of entropy in a sense goes
back to Bolzmann, the starting-point for the modern development is Gold’s article
[3] in 1962. In this paper, Gold argues that the second law of thermodynamics
might be a consequence of an expanding universe. A natural consequence of this
idea is that in a contracting universe, entropy will decrease and we are therefore
naturally lead to consider a completely symmetric model for the universe with low
entropy in both ends.
Today however, few cosmologists support this view of a symmetric behaviour
of the entropy, and hence most efforts since Gold have concentrated on trying to
understand why the behaviour is non-symmetric. The main strategies are:
• We can try to explain the arrow of time by making appeal to some kind of
lack of symmetry in the boundary conditions of the universe.
• We can try to explain the arrow of time by making appeal to some kind of
lack of symmetry in the laws of physics themselves.
Clearly, if we somehow suppose that the universe immediately after the Big Bang
was very smooth and ordered, and that the ultimate future of the universe (whether
viewed as a Big Crunch or as an eternal expansion) will be very disordered, then
the increase of entropy in-between may appear quite natural. But this still leaves
us with the question why the boundary conditions should be so highly asymmetric.
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Steven Hawking, in his early attempts to understand the arrow of time in terms of
his ”no boundary condition approach”, adopted Gold’s view. Later, after criticism
from Don Page and Raymond Laflamme, he abandoned this idea and extended his
analysis of the no boundary condition to conclude that there could be two types of
behaviour of the universe close to the end-points, one which fits nicely with a low-
entropy Big Bang, and another one which fits with a high-entropy Big Crunch (see
[4]). It can be argued that the real problem is to give a satisfactory explanation of
how these different boundary behaviours are coupled with each other. Nevertheless,
it may be that Hawking’s analysis is an important part of the answer.
An example of the another kind of explanation is given by Penrose’s suggestion
that the growth of entropy is connected with the Weyl tensor [5]. There are also
attempts to connect the arrow of time with the apparently time-asymmetric be-
haviour of the K-meson. If we adopt this view, then the dynamical laws become
explicitly non-symmetric. The problem in this case is that it seems very difficult
to connect this with the second law of thermodynamics which is basically a macro-
scopic, classical phenomenon.
The point that I want to make is that it may in fact be that neither of the
two strategies above is actually necessary to explain the asymmetry of time. I will
argue that if we adopt the multiverse point of view, the ideas of symmetric laws
and of a symmetry between the initial state and the end-state of our universe are
very well compatible with the kind of asymmetric behaviour of time that we can
observe. The underlying principle for this phenomenon can be described as follows:
When we replace a symmetric deterministic dynamical law by a non-deterministic
one, a break of symmetry occurs which generates multiple histories in one of the
two possible directions of time. Although the situations which I will discuss in this
paper are very simple and essentially classical, the mechanism in it self appears to
be of such a general character that it may very well carry over to more complex
geometric and quantum mechanical situations.
3. The multiverse view-point
According to the common Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics,
time development is deterministic but the wave-function does not determine the
exact position and momentum of a given particle. Any measurement effects the
particle (or the associated wave-function) in such a way that the particle, after
the measurement, will be in an eigenstate of the corresponding dynamical variable.
This view-point has been remarkably effective for computing all kinds of results.
However, in recent years an alternative interpretation has become increasingly
popular. This is the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics, initiated by
Everett [2]. According to this interpretation, each outcome of a measurement of
a variable represents a real development. And the fact that a measurement has
produced a certain value just indicates that what the observer thinks of as his
universe is nothing more than a branch of the multiverse where the result of the
measurement is the true value of the given variable.
Although fundamentally different in the way they perceive reality, it is often
supposed that these two views are equivalent for practical reasoning, thus making
it more or less a matter of taste which view-point to choose. In my opinion this
is a mistake, and it is part of the raison d’eˆtre for this paper to argue that the
multiverse interpretation can actually be used to explain physical properties that
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can not be explained by the Copenhagen interpretation. In particular, this may be
the case with the second law of thermodynamics.
In my interpretation, the underlying principle which gives sense to the multiverse
interpretation is a property of the dynamical laws which makes equally good sense
in a classical setting as in a quantum mechanical one. The essentially classical
dynamical law in Section 5 below can be seen as a simple example of this. Thus,
different developments which agreed in the past may slide apart just as in the
quantum mechanical case.
But there is of course one very important difference: In the classical setting, each
possible development will be completely independent of any other, and the lack of
determinacy in the dynamical laws will, to an observer living in such a world, appear
to be completely at random. In other words, to such an observer, the randomness
that he experiences will really look as if God is playing dice. In the quantum
mechanical setting however, different developments actually do interact with each
other on the micro-level. This is for example the content of the optical experiment
where photons pass through two parallel slits, and where the interference that we
observe can only be understood if we assume that each photon simultaneously must
pass through both slits. Thus an observer can actually perform measurements which
confirm the existence of multiple developments.
Einstein’s original statement, that ”God does not play dice” expressed his deep
scepticism towards the probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. In fact,
for an almighty God to include randomness in his creation could almost appear as a
kind of cheating. However, in the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics,
nothing happens by chance. Everything which is possible actually does happen,
although we can not in general experience it all simultaneously. Thus in a sense it
is rather quantum mechanics, not classical mechanics, which tells us that the world
is not probabilistic. Or to put it differently: Quantum mechanics may be the best
argument we have for saying that God is not playing dice
Before we proceed to investigate the asymmetry of time, there is also another
point which has to be clarified. There are in fact different ways of viewing the arrow
of time. The concept which is based on entropy, is often called the thermodynamic
arrow of time. But an equally natural and important concept is what could be
called the historical arrow of time. According to this view, what is characteristic
of the past is that it is unique and that we can actually remember it. We have in
general a very good view of the historical development that has lead us to the state
that we observe now, but it is much harder to be sure about the consequences that
the present state will lead to. Stated somewhat differently, the past is the direction
in which the development is uniquely traceable and there seems to be a unique
chain of macroscopic states connecting our present reality back to the Big Bang.
All experience that we have seems to support the belief that these different
aspects of time’s arrow are equivalent. But even if so, the equivalence is by no
means a trivial one. And, especially in situations where our usual intuition does
not apply, one should be very careful when identifying them. This is in particular
the case when we deal with the state of our universe immediately after the Big Bang
(or before a possible Big Crunch). Nevertheless, in this paper I will mostly take
for granted that these different concepts of time are equivalent, except possibly in
extreme states close to the beginning or end of time.
Let us summarise the idea of the historical arrow of time:
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Claim 1 (about the unique past). Every state that we have ever observed seems
to have a unique past.
In fact, no one has ever successfully tried to explain our present state by assuming
both that Caesar did cross the Rubicon and that he did not.
Remark 1. Clearly this is in a certain sense no longer true in quantum physics: The
microscopic world is full of counterexamples, e.g. the above mentioned experiment
with photons passing simultaneously through parallel slits and afterwards interact-
ing with themselves. And the distinction between macroscopic and microscopic is
not always easy to make as testified by Schro¨dinger’s famous cat.
One could wonder if it is a problem in the present situation that Claim 1 may fail
at the quantum level. I would argue that it is not. In fact, the Claim is of course
true in an appropriate sense, i.e. even from the quantum mechanical point of view
every state that we have ever observed does seem to have a unique macroscopic
history. See however the discussion in Section 7.
If we accept the multiverse point of view, we can add to the Claim above a
second one:
Claim 2 (about the non-unique future). Every state that we have ever observed
has a non-unique future.
To put it in another way: There are, in any possible physical situation, phenom-
ena which are genuinely unpredictable like for instance radioactive decay. Accord-
ing to the multiverse point of view, every such event represents a fork in the road
towards the future.
These two claims summarise the basic properties of nature that our dynamical
laws should reflect. In the next Section I will discuss in more detail what kind of
laws this could imply.
4. The dynamical laws
From my point of view a very natural starting point for trying to understand
the obvious time-asymmetry in the two Claims 1 and 2 is the ”Principle of Least
Action”, found in every comprehensive textbook on mechanics. This principle has
a long history, but its formulation is generally attributed to Maupertius in 1746.
It states that a physical system must develop in such a way that the action of
the system is (locally) minimised. The principle is very general and in a certain
sense the dynamical laws of both general relativity and quantum mechanics can be
formulated in such a way. However, from the point of view of working physicists,
this principle is usually considered merely as a convenient tool for obtaining the
equations of motion. These usually turn out to be completely deterministic: Given
positions and momenta for a system of particles (or the corresponding data for the
wave-function) on a certain space-like hyper-surface, the equations of motion can
be used to compute the state of the system at any time in the future or in the past,
at least in theory.
Although the two ways of looking at the problem, as a minimising problem or an
initial-value problem, are usually considered to be perfectly equivalent, let me note
that from a philosophical point of view they differ fundamentally in a way which
is closely related to the Claims 1 and 2 above, and as a consequence also to the
difference between the Copenhagen interpretation and the multiverse interpretation
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of quantum mechanics. Whereas the initial-value approach uses only data given at
a certain time to compute the future development, the minimising approach uses
data at two different moments of time to calculate the development in between. To
further stress this point, let me formulate a possible interpretation of this in a way
which connects the principle of least action with the two Claims above, and which
at the same time clarifies the role of the boundary conditions for the universe:
Principle 1 (of Least Action). Given the states of a system at two different space-
like hyper-surfaces, the development of the system in between is (generically) com-
pletely unique (and determined by locally minimising the action).
Principle 2 (of Multiple Futures (and Pasts)). Given only the state of a system
at one space-like hyper-surface, the development of the system is in general not
unique, neither forwards nor backwards.
Remark 2. Formulated in this way, these principles are clearly symmetric with
respect to the direction of time.
One should be a little bit careful when using the word deterministic in this con-
text. In fact, the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics is usually thought
of as a completely deterministic theory, since time-translation is a unitary opera-
tion. This however, does not mean that the world is predictable to an experimenter
confined to one universe.
It should also be noted that these two principles may be said to have different
status. The first one is a generally excepted fact. As for the second one, it may very
well be controversial. Nevertheless, if we insist on both the symmetry of dynamical
laws and the multiverse point of view, this is what we have to accept.
Clearly, if we accept Principle 2, then our assumptions about the boundary
conditions in the past and in the future will play symmetrical and equally important
roles.
5. Symmetry breaking in a simple dynamical principle
So what kind of symmetric law of physics could possibly generate this manifestly
asymmetric behaviour in Claims 1 and 2? In this section I will present a very
simple example where what from a deterministic point of view appears to be a
time-symmetric dynamical law, from the multiverse point of view gives rise to
symmetry-breaking.
Consider a single particle in Euclidian 3-space. In the following (and for the rest
of this paper), we will only be concerned with discrete time. Thus the movement of
the particle from a to b may be described as a sequence of points {r(tk)}mk=0 where
r(t0) = a, r(tm) = b, and where {tk}mk=0 is the corresponding sequence of (equi-
distant) moments of time. To keep things as simple as possible, we will assume
that the particle is not interacting with anything at all. From a classical point of
view such a particle should thus obey Newton’s first law
A deterministic time-symmetric microscopic description of Newton’s first law
could be formulated as follows: If the positions of the particle at times k − 1 and
k+1 are r(tk−1) and r(tk+1) respectively, then the position of the particle at time
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This can be reformulated in the following way: The dynamical law of the particle
is given by the condition
(2) Jk = 0 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 where Jk = |r(tk−1)− 2r(tk) + r(tk+1)|.
A non-deterministic analogue of this would be to attribute the unnormalized
probability
(3) pk = exp{−µJ
2
k}
to the position r(tk) at tk, given the corresponding positions at times tk−1 and
tk+1, where µ > 0 is some number. If we multiply these probabilities together, we








for the path {r(tk)}mk=0, thus obtaining a kind of statistical Ensemble for the set of
all possible paths from a to b.
Remark 3. The choice of the formula for pk in (3) may look a bit arbitrary but it is
not. It can be argued using the central limit theorem that essentially any choice of
weight at a sufficiently small scale will result in this kind of expression on a larger
scale.
Note also that if we can recapture the deterministic behaviour in (1) from the
non-deterministic Ensemble in (4) by maximising p. In fact, maximising p is equiv-





which is obviously done by choosing Jk = 0 for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1.
The interesting point of the model emerges however, when we start to look at
the kind of non-deterministic paths which are likely to lead from a to b. Let us
suppose that a = b = 0. It is then reasonable to ask where the particle is most
likely to reach its maximal distance from the origin. To be more precise, we define
qk as the probability (with respect the Ensemble in (4) that the maximal distance
occurs at time tk. Writing for simplicity rk instead of r(tk), we have









J2k} dr1dr2 . . . drm−1,
where Ωk = {(r1, . . . , rm−1); |rk| > max{|r1|, |r2|, . . . |rk−1|, |rk+1|, . . . |rm−1|}} and
Σ is a just the appropriate normalising factor. A natural guess might be to assume
the following typical behaviour: After starting out from 0, the particle gradually
moves away and somewhere in the middle between t = 0 and t = m reaches the
maximal distance. After this it then gradually returns to 0 in a more or less
symmetric way. But even if this type of path may generate the largest probability
weights in (4), the number of such paths is small compared to the number of paths
which so to speak neglect one of the boundary conditions as long as they can. In
fact, the computer plot in figure 1 exhibits a behaviour which is quite different
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figure 1.
from this (with µ = 5 and m = 10). The figure to the left shows the probabilities
qk as a function of time, and the figure to the right shows the same values on a
logarithmic scale. Increasing values of µ seem to tend to accentuate the picture.
This represents a situation commonly encountered in statistical mechanics where
the states with the largest Boltzmann factor exp{−βH} are not always the states
that occur in reality.
Conclusion 1. Clearly, we have a break of symmetry: A particle obeying the non-
deterministic dynamical principle in (4) will either tend to be close to the determin-
istic path in the beginning and to deviate in the end or vice versa, but the chance
for a symmetric behaviour is very small. This throws new light on the lack of sym-
metric in Claims 1 and 2. In fact, in view of the very general character of the
dynamical principle, one may suspect that this type of behaviour is the rule rather
than an exception.
Remark 4. It should be noted that this phenomenon can also be interpreted as a
problem for the use of the calculus of variation on the micro-level: We can not in
general in the non-deterministic situation hope that the kind of paths which tend
to minimise the expression in (4) (or more generally, the action of a system) will
adapt well to the boundary conditions that we may want to impose.
But we can also look upon this from an opposite point of view. It may very
well be that a variational principle is the natural way in which nature rules over
matter, but that we are actually ourselves interfering with this process by putting
up boundary conditions (e.g. by making measurements).
There may be a very interesting link between this and the well-known fact of
quantum mechanics that we can not measure the position of a particle without
disturbing its dynamical development.
Remark 5. The computer calculations in this paper have all been carried out using
Mathematica on a small Macintosh computer. It should be pointed out that the
computations are not at all exact, and this is so for very fundamental reasons.
When analysing this kind of models, we inevitably come across multiple integrals
in a large number of variables and hence encounter what is in the trade sometimes
called ”The curse of dimensionality problem”, i.e. the fact that the time needed to
compute multiple integrals grows exponentially with dimension (see [1]). From this
point of view, computing integrals with 15 variables is already difficult (except for
certain classes of integrands). Using quasi-Monte-Carlo methods (as I do in this
paper) one may sometimes be able to obtain some kind of results for, say, 50 or
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100 variables, but these should not be confused with exact mathematics. Rather,
pictures like the ones in figure 1 should be considered as the results of physical
experiments which hopefully, but not with certainty, reflect the true state of affairs.
It is usually not possible to estimate the errors involved, and in some cases one
can get results which are obviously not true. Having said this, I want to add that
the computations in this paper seem to be relatively stable under changes of the
parameters involved which is usually a good indication.
6. The cosmological view of the multiverse
In this section I will introduce a very simplified but full-scale model for the
multiverse. Our knowledge of the actual global structure of space-time is limited.
We have a reasonably good picture of the ”Big Bang” some 14 billion years ago,
but we know considerably less about the future. Although many votes in recent
years have been in favour of an ever expanding universe instead of a ”Big Crunch”,
we do not really know anything for sure as long as the origin of dark energy, mass
and gravitation in general is not well understood.
I have chosen in this paper to work with a bounded model for space-time. The
reason is not that this should necessarily be the only or the most likely model.
Rather, the motivation is that in this case, the underlying global structure of space-
time is symmetric, which makes the problem with the direction of time come out
more clearly. Also, the mathematics is simpler in the bounded case, and for the
purpose of this paper there is really no reason to choose a more complicated model
than necessary.
Remark 6. Before we go further, it may still be worthwhile to comment briefly on
the relevance of this discussion for other non-bounded models. If we first consider
the case of an infinite (”ergodic”) space which is finite in time, then as long as
each part of space only interacts with a bounded part of the whole, I believe that
basically the same kind of arguments could be applied. Inevitably, the mathematics
would have to be more cumbersome in this case. But on the other hand, the same
thing could be said about for instance the extension of quantum mechanics, since
global wave-functions would no longer form a Hilbert space. Thus the question of
whether such an effort is worthwhile must be resolved in view of all other advantages
and drawbacks that such a model may have.
As for the case of a space-time which extends infinitely into the future, the
question is somewhat different. From a microscopic point of view there is actually
no difference at all. The problem is that if we choose to believe in laws of physics
which are (essentially) symmetric with respect to time, then in one way or another
we will have to make up our minds about the boundary conditions in the future.
Even if the same basic mechanism seems to work equally well in the case of an open
universe, we simply know less about the constraints that the future may impose on
us in this case, in contrast to the closed universe where there is a natural candidate
for the boundary behaviour at the end. As a matter of fact, to assume that an open
universe will just go on creating its path into the future without any constraints
may be just another one of these anthropic traps, based on our deeply rooted view
of the future as something which is created out of the present.
From now on the multiverse will be viewed as the collection of all possible devel-
opments from the Big Bang to the Big Crunch within the framework of a certain
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global structure of space-time. This means that we will discard important effects
of general relativity and inflation theory, just as we have already decided to discard
much of quantum theory. In fact, the kind of multiverse that we will consider will
be rather similar to some kind of classical weakly interacting gas. This may be
a very bad approximation for most cosmological purposes, but can still be good
enough for the purpose of explaining the arrow of time.
Thus consider N particles which we for simplicity consider all to be identical.
These particles are supposed to inhabit a global geometric structure extended in
time between −T0 and T0. Furthermore, we assume time to be discrete, and by
choosing appropriate units we may assume that it only takes integer values. The
volume of the multiverse first expands and the contracts in a way which is essentially
symmetric with respect to time. The exact form of the volume as a function of time
is not very important in the following, but again for the sake of argument, let us
assume that the space-time structure behaves like the curve in figure 2, which
reaches its maximal value at the mid-point between −T0 and T0.
Concerning the end-states themselves, it could perhaps be argued that in a
model like this the most natural assumption would be to consider them as not only
symmetric states, but as states without any internal structure at all (except possibly
for such things as total mass-energy). However, the exact nature of these states is
not important in the following, so in view of Ockham’s razor one might also argue
that we should perhaps not suppose anything at all. What is important is that at
some point −T1 shortly after the Big Bang, the set F(−T1) of possible states of the
multiverse that can be obtained from the Big Bang corresponds symmetrically to a
similar set F(T1) of states at a time T1 shortly before the Big Crunch. This should
not be interpreted as implying that the end-states in a particular universe should be
similar in any way. Rather, it is a problem for the model that in a realistic treatment
including general relativity, there is no way in which we can simultaneously describe
these states within any kind of common geometric frame-work. In Section 10, I will
come back to this point.
In the following we will often need to count states. It is therefore important to
distinguish two different concepts:
Definition 1. An elementary state is a possible state of one particle.
The number E(t) of different possible elementary states at a certain time is
assumed to be roughly proportional to the volume V (t) of the geometry at that
time.
Definition 2. A global state (or just simply a state in the following) is a possible
configuration of all the N particles.
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Within this framework, an enormous amount of different developments are pos-
sible, and to each of them the laws of quantum mechanics will attribute a certain
probability. To simplify the model even further we will not consider the precise
probability for each development but rather simply classify each step as ”possible”
or ”impossible” thus attributing the (unnormalized) probabilities 1 and 0 to them.
Definition 3. A universe is a chain of a states within the given global geometry,
one state St at time t for each t between −T0 and T0, with the property that the
transition between two adjacent states is always possible according to the dynamical
laws.
Definition 4. The multiverse is the set of all possible universes in the sense of
Definition 3.
The multiverse is thus a kind of huge compact (actually finite) probability space
where we have assigned equal probability to all elements. The task is now to try
to decide in a heuristic way what types of universes are the most common ones in
very much the same spirit as one analyses Ensembles in statistical mechanics.
Definition 5. A certain state St at a certain time t is said to be backwards unique if
there is exactly one possible chain of states connecting it back to a state in F(−T1).
Similarly, a certain state St at a certain time t said to be forwards unique if there
is exactly one possible chain of states connecting forward to a state in F(T1).
Remark 7. To say that a state St of a universe is backwards unique is thus the
same as saying that it has a unique history. Or as saying that the arrow of time
points forwards.
As a matter of definition every state in F(−T1) is backwards unique and every
state in F(T1) is forwards unique. But what happens with the arrow of time in-
between? A priori it is not at all obvious that there is any sensible definition of
time’s arrow in-between. But in the following when discussing possible universes,
I will restrict myself to such chains of states where every state on the way from
−T1 to T1 is either backwards or forwards unique. In other words, the only type of
universes that will be considered are those where the interval [−T1, T1] splits into
two parts, [−T1, Q] and [Q, T1], where time’s arrow points forwards on the first part
and backwards on the second part.
Definition 6. The time Q will be called the peak point and the time intervals
[−T1, Q] and [Q, T1] will be called the backwards and forwards unique phases re-
spectively.
Remark 8. The name peak point of course refers to the fact that from the thermo-
dynamic point of view, this should be the point where the entropy is maximal (see
figure 3).
The motivation for assuming that there is a peak point in every universe is not
a physical one. Rather, the reason for introducing it is connected to the purpose
of this paper. My ambition is to try to argue that the asymmetry of time in
our universe is very well compatible with a multiverse governed by completely
symmetric principles, so I will be content with comparing developments which are
sufficiently general to illustrate this point. Thus the question why we live in a world
where it makes sense to speak of history at all, and likewise the question how the
switching from leftward to rightward uniqueness actually takes place, are somewhat
outside the scope of this investigation.
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Now consider a certain state St at a time t ∈ [−T1, Q[. Thus St is backwards
unique but according to the discussion in Section 3 we do not in general expect it
to be forwards unique, So how many different states are possible to obtain at time
t+1 from St? Since an exact computation is clearly impossible to make, the answer
will have to be given by a crude approximation:
Heuristic Assumption 1. For any t ∈] − T1.T1[, the number of states at time
t+ 1 obtainable from the given state St is given by a constant K which is roughly
independent of St. Similarly, the number of states at time t−1 obtainable from the
given state St at time t is given by K.
Remark 9. The underlying reason for this assumption is that as long as the number
E(t) of possible states at time t accessible to the particles is much larger than the
number N of particles, the number K should depend on N , rather than on E(t).
Whether the universe is expanding or contracting, or whether the density is high
or low within reasonable limits, we still assume that K essentially depends on the
number of choices (or ”forks in the road”) open to each individual particle. Needless
to say, this approximation must be a very bad one in a realistic multiverse. But it
could still be reasonable in the kind of situation we are dealing with.
7. Time’s arrow, a heuristic approach
Let us now suppose that we start with anyone of the K1 states in F(−T1).
According to the heuristic assumption 1, this state will after one unit of time give
rise to K possible states, after two units of time we have K2 states and so on. T
units of time after −T1 we will have a total of
(8) K1K
T
possible states. But are they all different? If they are then all the developments
leading to them are all backwards unique. On the other hand, clearly when the
global geometry of the multiverse starts to shrink and thus the number of states
starts to decrease, we must sooner or later reach a point where the actual number
of states will be less than the number of states predicted by formula (8). But then
of course, not all of them can be backwards unique, since some of them will have
to end up at the same state.
Whether this will happen or not before time T1 clearly depends on the size of
the number K. And to estimate this accurately seems difficult. On the other hand,
as stated in Claim 1, all experience that we have from our own universe definitely
tells us that history tends to be unique. We will return to this question in Remark
12 below.
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Heuristic Assumption 2. When computing the chance that different develop-
ments actually will meet at a certain time t, we will in the following assume that
they behave as statistically independent variables.
Remark 10. This assumption must be interpreted with some care. In fact, quantum
mechanics tells us that developments which have very recently separated have a
good chance of interfering with each other shortly afterwards. In the following
I will assume that the constant K measures the ”effective” rate with which the
number of the number of possible states grows.
Of course, the above heuristic assumption could not possibly be true in any strict
sense in a multiverse inhabited by the kind of particles we are used to. In fact, even
in universes with very different developments, the particles would probably tend to
organise themselves in similar structures, like atoms and molecules.
Suppose now that we have numbers T0 > T1 > T2 such that
(9) T0 − T1 ≪ T0 − T2 ≪ T0.
As has already been said, the exact form of the dependence of the diameter on t is
not at all important, but for the sake of definiteness we may for instance assume
that, say, D(t) = D0 cos(tpi/2T0), which gives a similar formula for the volume V (t)
as a function of t: V (t) = V0 cos
3(tpi/2T0).
Claim 3. Suppose that K is such that the chance for two different developments
starting from some states at time −T1 to meet before time T1 is neglectably small.






where G(t) is the number of (global) states of the global geometry at time t.
The heuristic idea here is very simple: We can compute the number of backwards
unique developments up to time t and we also can compute the number of forwards
unique developments from t and onwards. To get the total number of developments
with peak point at t we need only estimate how many such backwards unique
developments will fit onto a forwards unique continuation. This is easy if we make
use of the heuristic assumption 2.
In fact, the number of such universes is given by the total number of backwards
unique developments up to time t multiplied by the probability that such a de-
velopment will fit onto a forwards unique development from the future. From the
heuristic assumption 2 we see that the latter is given by the number of such possible
developments divided by G(t). Thus according to the heuristic assumption 1:













Remark 11. Clearly, this way of calculating N (t) is symmetric with respect to the
direction of time.
We have now arrived at the following
Claim 4. The overwhelming majority of all possible universes have their peak-
points in [−T0,−T2] or [T2, T0], not in [−T2, T2].
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In fact, in view of the previous Claim 3, the number N2 of universes which peak


























∝ (T0 − T2)
−3N+1.







∝ (T0 − T1)
−3N+1.
Thus, since the ratio between the number of developments with peak point in
[−T2, T2] and the total number of developments is obviously less then the corre-
sponding ratio between the number of developments with peak point in [−T2, T2]
and those with peak point in [−T1, T1], we get the following estimate for the per-











which will be extremely small in view of (9). This proves the claim.
8. A numerical comparison
The above construction could at best be said to model a kind of idealised semi-
classical multiverse inhabited by identical particles which behave more or less like
a weakly interacting gas. Although I make no claims what so ever for this model to
reflect the details of our actual multiverse, it can still be interesting to insert some
numerical data from cosmology to show what kind of magnitudes are involved if we
consider a structure of the size of our observable universe.
Thus let the number of particles N be of the order of magnitude (corresponding
to the number of particles in our observable universe):
(17) N ∼ 1080.
We take the basic unit of time to be the Planck time = 10−45 seconds. Suppose
also (quite arbitrarily but for the sake of argument) that the life-span M = 2T0 of
this multiverse is of the order of magnitude
(18) M ∼ 1064 in Planck time units
which approximately corresponds to 300 billion years. The number of possible
different elementary states within a volume V that a particle can occupy is (again
quite arbitrarily) taken to be approximately equal to the number of cells with
TIME’S ARROW FROM THE MULTIVERSE POINT OF VIEW 15
diameter equal to the Planck length (∼ 10−33 cm) that it contains, which gives
approximately 1099 states/cm3.
The difference T0−T1 must be chosen so large that the number of states at time
T1 is much larger than the number of developments leading there. If we for instance
take T0−T1 = 10
35 (= 10−10 seconds), then according to standard inflation theory
the diameter of the global geometry may be of the order of magnitude ∼ 1012 cm,
which gives a total of 10135 elementary states. Thus the number of possible states








If we for example let K be of the order of magnitude
(20) K ∼ 10(10
10),














If we now set T0 − T2 = 10
45 (one second), then we see from (16) that the fraction
of universes with peak points further than one second away from the Big Bang or









Remark 12. The reader has probably noticed the arbitrariness in the choice of K.
I do not know what a reasonable value would be or how to compute it. However,
it should be noted that if we accept the multiverse point of view, then one can
argue that it is an experimental fact that K can not be too large. In fact, we
have already experienced our universe for something like 1063 Planck units of time,
without the slightest indication that our present state could be explained in terms
of macroscopically different histories.
Thus, if we estimate the diameter of our (observable) universe to something like
1032 cm, then computing the number of possible states at present in the same way









This is in fact not so far from what is needed for the discussion above (compare
(21)).
9. The polygonal multiverse
In the previous section I tried to argue on heuristic grounds that the second law
of thermodynamics and the arrow of time could be viewed as the result of a break
of symmetry in the multiverse. Although the numerical bias in favour of universes
with directed time is enormously large, the assumptions leading to this conclusion
are so heuristic that it is certainly appropriate to question there value. Therefor, in
this section I propose an attack on the problem from the opposite side: Instead of
considering the whole multiverse even in the simplified form of the previous section,
let us consider very small and simple models for it, and in these models try to prove,
16 MARTIN TAMM
by mathematics or by computer computations, that the kind of symmetry breaking
encountered in section 8 actually occurs.
In this paper, I will content myself with discussing one model, where numerical
computations are possible and symmetry breaking occurs, but where the number
of particles is much to small to speak of entropy in an interesting way and hence
where the concept of order/disorder has to be defined in a much more primitive
manner.
Thus, let the global structure be given by the set
(24) M = S1 × NM .
Here the unit circle S1 = R/Z furnishes the spacial part of the global structure, and
NM = {−m,−m + 1, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1,m} (where M = 2m) is the discrete
time ranging from −T0 = −m to T0 = m in the terminology of Section 8. We
suppose that this global geometry is inhabited by n particles xj , j = 0, 1, . . . , n−1.
A universe in this context is simply a collection of n sequences {xj.k}mk=−m, where
xj.k is the position of the j:th particle at time k. Thus, for each moment of time k
we can think of the state of the particles as a n-polygon with corners at the points
x0,k, x1,k, . . . , xn−1,k on S1.
The radius (and perimeter) of the spacial part varies with the time k as rk =
cos(pik/m). However, it is more convenient to use the same coordinate x ∈ [0, 1[
on S1×{k} for all k and instead include the expansion and contraction of space in
the dynamics (see (27) below).
At k = −m and k = m (−T0 and T0), we suppose that these n-polygons are
regular with corners at the points 0, 1/n, 2/n, . . . (n − 1)/n. More precisely, we
assume that the j:th particle xj has coordinate j/n. In a deterministic model, the
dynamics of the model would consist in an expansion and a contraction as above
with each particle having the same coordinate all the way from k = −m to k = m.
Thus at each moment of time the corresponding polygons would still be completely
regular. This can be thought of as a universe in which the only dynamical principle
which comes into play is Newton’s first law. It is created perfectly uniform and
preserves this property throughout its existence.
But we can now, in analogy with what was done in section 5 also introduce a
non-deterministic dynamical principle. In this case we simply assume that each
particle xj interacts with its neighbour xj+1 in the following way (we identify xn
with x0): The most probable distance from xj to xj+1 at time k is the average of
the corresponding distances at time k − 1 and k + 1, or in other words,
(25) xj+1,k − xj,k =
1
2
((xj+1,k−1 − xj,k−1) + (xj+1,k+1 − xj,k+1))
Hence, if we define
(26) Jj,k = (xj+1,k−1 − xj,k−1)− 2(xj+1,k − xj,k) + (xj+1,k+1 − xj,k+1)
then the deterministic principle is equivalent to the requirement that Jj,k = 0 for
all j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 and k = 1, 2, . . .m − 1. The reader may find it amusing to
think of this law as a kind of Mach’s principle in this miniature world. The non-
deterministic principle is now obtained by replacing this condition by a probability
weight
(27) pj,k = exp{−ckJ
2
j,k},
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where the ck:s are constants. Of course, we want to assume the dynamical law to
be the same all over, but here we must also remember that the length-scale on the
spacial part S1 varies with time. Hence, the coordinates xj,k should actually be
multiplied with rk to give the correct length. For this reason we will put ck = c(rk)
2.
This gives a slight bias in weighting between the influence from k − 1 and k + 1
respectively when the radius of the spatial part expands or contracts, which I
however will not consider important.








which gives us the Ensemble.
Remark 13. Clearly both the Ensemble and the deterministic law (25) are time-
symmetric, i.e. remain unchanged under the transformation k 7→ −k.
From this Ensemble we can clearly recapture the deterministic dynamical law in





This is clearly done (as in Section 5) by choosing all Jj,k = 0.
We will only be interested in values of c which are comparatively large, in which
case the developments which have a reasonable chance of occurring can be consid-
ered to be small perturbations of the deterministic one. In this case, the chance
that two particles will ever cross each others paths is very small, and it is obviously
meaningless to talk about entropy of the polygon in any usual sense. But we can
instead measure how irregular it is at time k by measuring how much its centre
angles differ from the regular value 2pi/n. Since the centre angles are given by
2pi(xj+1 − xj), we can thus take






as a measure of irregularity or ”disorder” in the polygonal universe at time k. Note
that this measure only measures the form of the polygon and is independent of the
actual size of the global geometry.
Figure 4 shows a computer plot (using Mathematica) of the probability qk that
Sk at time k is larger than the deviation at every other time, and in figure 5 we
have the corresponding logarithmic plot. In this picture, the parameters have been
chosen to be M = 2m = 30, n = 3 and c = 25. Clearly, in this case we see that
with very high probability, maximal disorder occurs close to one of the end-points
−T0 and T0.
10. Time’s arrow, conclusions
I this paper, I have discussed the arrow of time from different perspectives. In a
way, the results that come out all point in the same direction: Whenever determin-
istic dynamics is replaced by the multiverse point of view, the symmetry of time




is that the arrow of time may point in different directions in different parallel uni-
verses: What is the future to us may very well be history to the inhabitants of
another parallel universe.
However, the gap between the cosmological model in Sections 6-8 and the micro-
multiverse in Section 9 is too large to be satisfactory. What I would really want
to do to bridge this gap is to apply the computational approach of Section 9 to a
model which is large enough to make real computations with entropy meaningful.
A nice example would perhaps be furnished by a classical gas of, say, 100 particles
in three-space, weakly interacting in agreement with some dynamical principle, on
a time-axis from −T0 to T0, containing perhaps 100 units of time. This would
probably be enough in order to study the entropy and to look for conditions on
the dynamics which would assure that the entropy with overwhelming probability
assumes its maximum close to one of the end-points. However, this problem may be
very difficult in view of the computational difficulties involved. In fact, numerical
computations in such a model would involve integrating 30000 variables. In view of
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”the curse of dimensionality” discussed in Remark 5, this is clearly far out of reach
for the somewhat primitive computational methods used in this paper. In other
words, to master such a model seems to be an interesting and highly non-trivial
problem for research, the solution of which will probably have to make use of both
computational power and clever mathematics.
But even if this could be managed, how relevant is a model which behaves essen-
tially like some kind of weakly interacting classical gas in an essentially Euclidian
global geometry with finite volume, no curvature and no inflation? To accept
Euclidian geometry and a classical approximation to quantum mechanics for the
purpose of studying the second law of thermodynamics can in my opinion be rather
reasonable, the weakest part of it being the schematic way of classifying develop-
ments simply as possible and impossible as was done in Section 6 instead of trying
to compute the actual probabilities. As a matter of fact, at least from my point
of view, entropy can be thought of as an essentially classical macroscopic concept.
More problematic points are:
(1) The idea of the particles as weakly interacting.
(2) The behaviour near the end-points.
(3) The behaviour in the future if the global geometry will expand for ever.
The particles in our universe are definitely not weakly interacting but rather tend
to group themselves together into things like atoms, human beings, planets and
stars. This will of course very much influence the behaviour of the entropy. But
in this sense, probably every model that we will ever construct will have to be a
coarse approximation, even if one can hope to do much better than in this paper.
As for the behaviour near the end-points, something better should definitely
be done. In Section 6, I have eliminated this behaviour simply by starting the
analysis at times −T1 and T1 instead of −T0 and T0, and by requiring there to be
a symmetry between the sets of possible states at these times. It is not necessarily
a problem in itself that these sets may contain states of very different character.
But it is definitely unrealistic to think that these states could be described by the
same global geometry: A Big Crunch with enormous black holes somehow being
squeezed together into zero volume must surely have a geometry very different from
the smooth Big Bang. At this point we must leave the classical approximation and
involve both general relativity and quantum theory. And it may be that something
similar to Hawking’s analysis mentioned in Section 2 could do the job.
The case of an ever expanding global geometry may be seen both as a problem
and as a possibility. It can be seen by computer experiments that the kind of
behaviour that we have encountered earlier can occur also without assuming a Big
Bang and a Big Crunch. I have not included any extra figures to illustrate this
point, but figure 1 in section 5 can actually be interpreted as representing a broken
symmetry in a multiverse with constant volume and only one particle.
The real problem here is that we do have to make up our minds about the
”boundary condition” or more generally about the behaviour in the future. As an
example, I can mention that if we consider an expanding model with a dynamical
principle of the type we have met in Sections 5 and 9, but put a perfectly ordered
boundary condition at the expanding end (for practical reasons after a finite time),
then we get a multiverse where the peak point is extremely likely to lie close to the
starting point: In other words, from the point of view of a possible inhabitant of
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such a universe, history would start from an ordered state of infinite volume and
then steadily contract into a Big Crunch.
One way out is of course to adopt the view that the explanation of the asymmetry
of time is to be found in a corresponding asymmetry in the underlying laws of
nature. In this case it may be that the relevant microscopic dynamical principle will
only depend on information from one direction. If the final cosmological conclusion
will be that our universe is expanding for ever, then this may in fact in a way be
the most attractive solution.
But if we insist that the underlying dynamical laws should be (essentially) time-
symmetric, then we must inevitably say something about the future since in this
case it would be no more logical to say that the future does not influence us than
to say that the past does not.
As I see it, there are in this case two ways out: Either we try to find a boundary
condition at infinity which in some sense we can argue is natural. Or we can
argue that most of the possible boundary conditions should be very disordered
for statistical reasons. The sad part is that it is so much more difficult to make
observations of the future: It could be in this case that we would simply have to
live with our ignorance.
Another point that I would like to comment is the question how natural the
dynamical principles of Sections 5 and 9 are. One could of course say that physicists
have a long-time habit of constructing variational principles to fit with practical
needs. But if one really believes that Maupertius idea contains some fundamental
truth of nature, this argument is clearly not good enough.
The argument that I have already mentioned in Section 6 is better: Even if
the construction process is not very natural, the central limit theorem shows that
the final result is more or less independent of what kind of stochastic process is
involved, as long as all this takes place on a much smaller scale.
However, from my own personal point of view neither of these motives were de-
cisive. As a matter of fact, my interest in this field started within general relativity,
where I from a strictly geometric point of view have used the idea of multiple histo-
ries to derive a kind of geometric principle of least action (see [6]). The dynamical
principles in this paper can in a certain sense be viewed as simple analogues of
that. This geometric principle of least action is defined geometrically in terms of
the curvature tensor and does not depend on time in any other way than through
the metric.
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